Research

MODAL INTENSIONALISM   

Journal of Philosophy (112): 309-334

We sometimes say things like this: “being an animal is part of being a dog.” We associate the part with a precondition for exemplifying the whole. A new semantics for modal logic results when we take this way of speaking seriously. We need not treat necessary truths as truths in all possible worlds. Instead, we may treat them as preconditions for the existence of any world at all. I present this semantics for modal propositional logic and argue that it operates on a more basic level of modal reality than possible world semantics.

MODAL SEMANTICS WITHOUT WORLDS

Philosophy Compass (11): 702-715

Over the last half century, possible worlds have bled into almost every area of philosophy. In the metaphysics of modality, for example, philosophers have used possible worlds almost exclusively to illuminate discourse about metaphysical necessity and possibility. But some have recently begun to use properties to develop rivals to possible worlds semantics which may someday compare in formal power and capture the differnt systems of modal logic. In this paper, I do two things. I first offer a quick primer on possible worlds semantics. Then I discuss three rivals and the work they have left to do.

IN THE QUEUE

(titles suppressed for blind review)

 

A NEW SEMANTICS FOR FIRST-ORDER LOGIC

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A NEW SEMANTICS FOR STANDARD DEONTIC LOGIC

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ON IMPLICATURE IN ONTOLOGICAL DEBATES

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ON THE METAPHYSICS OF BITCOIN

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POPULAR PHILOSOPHY PIECE ON BITCOIN

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ON MODAL EPISTEMOLOGY

in progress